Historical Backgrounder: Notes on the war in Ukraine, by Anne-Laure Bonnel

March 23, 2022

Original article in French here.

Anne-Laure Bonnel is the director of the documentary film Donbass (2016). She has first-hand knowledge of the civil war in eastern Ukraine and has researched the historical context of conflict that dominates the attention of the world in 2022.

Translated from French by Dennis Riches, 2022/03/26

Notes on the war in Ukraine, by Anne-Laure Bonnel

About what happened diplomatically before the Russian offensive on February 23, 2022. I stress it is an offensive that I have never endorsed and that I condemn. But it is imperative to understand the facts. The following notes are the result of my research. This is not a press article. I include all the links, sources etc. This information is not new.

Contextualization: before 2014, to be read very carefully.

Protesters in Kiev facing Ukrainian security forces, 2013/12 REUTERS/Gleb Garanich

A COMPLEX SITUATION

The situation in Ukraine is more complex than the media portrays it. The country is heterogeneous, historically, linguistically and religiously.

The country is deeply divided between a western part with a strong European orientation and a pronounced nationalism, while in the east, the majority of the population is Russophile and Russian speaking. It hardly feels any Ukrainian identity.

This bipolarization is expressed in every election, as for example in the presidential election of 2004: the pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushenko won more than 80% of the vote in the western regions of the country, while his opponent Viktor Yanukovych won more than 80% of the vote in the eastern regions.

Another element must also be recalled. Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has been ruled by elites who have plundered the country, regardless of their political affiliation. While it is regrettable that President Yanukovych is part of this dynamic, he is far from being the only one. The leaders from the 2004 Revolution, presented as the most “democratic,” have also made extensive use of opportunities for corruption. In particular, Yulia Tymoshenko, the muse of the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian “Jeanne d’Arc,” is an edifying example.

This businesswoman, a real oligarch who made a fortune in the gas industry (she was president of the National Hydrocarbon Company /SEUU) became involved in politics in the mid-90s. In January 2001, while she was Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Energy, she was dismissed by President Kuchma, accused of “smuggling and falsifying documents,” and for fraudulently importing Russian gas in 1996, when she was president of SEUU.

Tymoshenko was arrested and served several weeks in prison. Then in 2009, she was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for illicit enrichment under gas contracts signed between Ukraine and Russia. Though her internment under Yanukovtich’s mandate had a political utility, it was in no way an arbitrary detention, as the evidence is overwhelming against this woman whose media image of purity is the opposite of reality.

As a result of this widespread corruption of the elites, the country was now bankrupt, and its leaders had to attend to its disastrous financial situation. Paradoxically, this is what Yanukovych, as incompetent and corrupt as he was, understood. Considering that the European aid proposed under the customs agreement, to be signed in November 2013 in Vilnius, was not enough (610 million euros), the Ukrainian president asked that it be increased to 20 billion euros, which Brussels refused. Also, he made an about-face in order to respond favorably to the Russian offer. Moscow was offering him $15 billion in direct aid and continuation of a very low price for natural gas. In addition to its financial attractiveness, this proposal was not inconsistent because most of Ukraine’s trade is with Russia, and its strategic sectors remain highly integrated into the economy of this country with which more than 240 agreements had been signed.

It was the prospect of this new trade agreement that provoked a reaction from nationalist parties and activists in the western region, who were pro-Western and anti-Russian. But the “popular” movement that took shape in November 2013 against President Yanukovych, with the stated aim of overthrowing him, flouted – regardless of the legitimacy of its cause – all the democratic rules to which the West refers. The movement committed a series of transgressions that politicians and the media were careful not to report on.

The “revolution” attacked a democratically elected president: Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election after an electoral process deemed transparent and honest by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was therefore totally legitimate and legal, even if he was corrupt.

The “revolutionaries” launched their movement when presidential elections were to be held in 2015. This means that if the opponents had respected the democratic game they claim to play, it would have been reasonable for them to wait a year to be rid of Yanukovych. However, they preferred to illegally overthrow the regime a year before the elections. This was an anti-democratic reaction.

This “revolution” was characterized by actions of extreme violence on the part of the demonstrators, far from the image of peaceful parades conveyed by the Western media. Quickly, weapons entered the game, and many policemen were shot dead.

The reason for this is that the most active elements of this “revolutionary” movement were ultra-nationalist ultra-radical groups (such as militiamen of Pravyi Sektor, UNA-UNSO, Svoboda, Tryzub, “White Hammer”).

They were particularly well trained and organized, which allowed them to take trained members of the security forces prisoner. It is therefore the violence of some that has prevailed over that of others. However, these groups have nothing in common with our European values of humanism, democracy, and tolerance, and some of their leaders joined the new government in Kiev. Yet the West has supported them and continues to do so.

This “revolution” defended only the interests of a part of Ukraine, that of the pro-West western half of the country. It neglected the votes of those who elected Yanukovych and who were in favor of the trade agreement with Russia. Worse, it violated the most basic rights of people in the eastern region. Indeed, as soon as it was appointed, the new provisional government immediately banned the use of Russian as the second official language of Ukraine, with nearly 30% of the population Russian-speaking (up to 70% in Crimea). This was a real provocation and a negation of the principle of respect for minorities.

This “revolution” therefore had astonishing characteristics: it was undemocratic, it was particularly violent, it included a large component of extremists, and it represented a minority in the country. This is the cause that the West supports. The “Maidan Revolution” gave birth to a self-proclaimed government from the street without any legitimacy other than that given by the bureaucracies and the Western media.

The current crisis is partly the result of the European Union’s desire to extend its influence to the east and reduce Russia’s influence over Ukraine. It was the EU that indirectly lit the blaze, even though it was unable to offer Kiev the financial aid that the Russians offered.

Moreover, the EU has adopted an anti-Russian attitude under the influence of Poland and the Baltic states, which harbor significant resentments towards Moscow. These states have contributed significantly to the hardening of European positions towards Russia, which are neither in the tradition nor in the interest of the countries of Western Europe. Let us recall in passing that these new entrants from Eastern Europe blindly followed the Americans in their invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, in the majority of cases, prefer to buy American armaments rather than European armaments. In their eyes, Washington’s support is more important than that of Brussels.

On the occasion of this crisis, the attitude of the Western countries was characterized by a very strong suspicion of Russia, part of an anti-Sovietism left over from the Cold War.

For NATO, “what Russia is doing in Ukraine violates the principles of the UN Charter. This threatens peace and security in Europe. Russia must cease its military activities and threats.” Thus spoke Anders Rasmussen, NATO secretary-general on March 2, 2022.

The Western attitude does not even seem to measure the extent of its contradictions: (1) How can we denounce a “Putin coup” and not condemn the violent character of Kiev against a democratically elected president? (2) How can we recognize “legitimate rights” to a part of the population (Western Ukraine) and deny these same rights to the rest of the country?

It is clear that Westerners seem to respect international law when it suits them and transgresses it when it is not favorable to their interests, trying to legitimize their action by an ever-fluctuating definition of “good” and “evil.”

To all those who are outraged by the Russian reaction, it is worth asking whether they protested with the same vehemence: (1) when the United States illegally invaded Iraq, producing false evidence about the so-called presence of weapons of mass destruction, ignoring the UN’s opposition and leaving that country in a catastrophic state? (2) when the West, led by France, totally went beyond the framework of UN Resolution 1973 in Libya, transforming the “protection of civilian populations” into an operation to overthrow Gaddafi, with the known deplorable result? (3) when Edward Snowden revealed the extent of the US NSA’s international spying and the wiretapping of the American population?

Ukraine has benefited from the assistance of the US government, as illustrated by the visit to Ukraine of CIA Director John Brennan in April 2014, which he did not even hide. (see https://www.huffpost.com/entry/john-brennan-ukraine_n_5147869)

But U.S. influence in Ukraine’s internal affairs took on a whole new dimension with the appointment on December 2, 2014, of Natalie Jaresko, a U.S. national, as Ukraine’s finance minister. Ukraine had nevertheless taken care to grant her Ukrainian citizenship on the day of her inauguration. The resume of this Chicago-born U.S. official can be viewed online. Among other things, Ms. Jaresko held various positions within the State Department, including that of 1st Head of the Economic Section of the US Embassy in Ukraine, from 1992 to 1995. In addition, before being appointed head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, Natalie Jaresko held the position of CEO of an investment fund, Horizon Capital, which held no less than $600 million in assets in Ukraine.

Finally, it should be remembered that in France the journalist Renaud Girard covered to the Ukrainian revolution of 2014 and deplored the management of it by Laurent Fabius. “No one understood,” he wrote. “There was a terrible mistake by Laurent Fabius on February 21, 2014 when he left Kiev (the Ukrainian capital then plagued by riots between police and pro-European protesters against the pro-Russian government) to go to China. No one understood the importance of this trip, as his German and Polish counterparts negotiated and were going to secure a historic agreement between pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych and the three opposition leaders. There was a terrible diplomatic failure.” (https://www.europe1.fr/international/Ukraine-affrontements-meurtriers-a-Kiev-645748)

The crisis and then the civil war in Ukraine are therefore the result of a succession of unfortunate events, totally unpredictable, as we can often see in history. On the other hand, European diplomacy was not very good at the beginning and in the middle of this crisis. When this partnership was proposed to Ukraine, it would have been necessary for a major political figure in the EU to make a solemn speech to say that it was offered in the same terms as Russia offered. We preferred to let the Brussels offices handle this issue and that was a mistake.

About the failed diplomatic mission:

On Wednesday, February 19, 2014, a meeting between François Hollande and Angela Merkel was organized in Paris. People had started shooting at each other in Kiev. To stop the bloodshed, the French president and the German chancellor decided to send the heads of their diplomacy there. The next day, Fabius and Steinmeier stopped in Warsaw, picked up Sikorski, and went to Ukraine. On the spot, everyone was aware that discussions had been going on with Yanukovych and the leaders of the opposition. This simple fact would have stopped the killings. This was already a considerable success! The negotiation continued all night. It was very hard. On Friday February 21, 2014, the European troika brilliantly reached an intra-Ukrainian political agreement.

On that day, at about five o’clock in the afternoon, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Oleh Tyahnybok and Vitali Klitschko were seen shaking hands with pro-Russian President Yanukovych. Unfortunately, incomprehensibly, the European ministers were unable to protect this newborn miracle child. They left the scene!

With such a phenomenal success as the February 21st agreement, they should have known it was a child that would need babysitting. The agreement provided, inter alia, for a change in the constitution, early elections, and a government of national unity.

Later that night, as the European ministers returned home, the three opposition leaders, after being booed by the Maidan crowd, renounced their signatures. President Yanukovych got scared, left Kiev, and headed to Kharkov.

It is said that he fled but the term is pejorative. Ukraine’s constitution had never prohibited the president from traveling wherever he wanted to go. He could have even spent a month on vacation in Bali. It was not unconstitutional for him to leave the country. While he was deposed the day after his departure from Kiev and the Russians spoke of a coup, they still had reason to say so, since nothing prohibited Yanukovych from leaving. The following Sunday, the Rada [the Ukrainian parliament] proceeded with a deplorable vote to renounce the recognition of Russian as the second official language of the eastern regions of Ukraine. The European ministers were no longer there… This was a great diplomatic failure, which will be taught in academies around the world, according to Renaud Girard of Figaro.

Former Foreign Minister under Jacques Chirac, Hubert Védrine, considers that the “wrongs are shared” between the West and Russia in the current diplomatic context. “We have arrived, by a series of deplorable steps, at the current situation,” explained the former minister. “When I say that the blame is shared, I mean the attitude of the West towards Russia, as if we were still dealing with the USSR. There has been a series of acts on the American side that show a kind of contempt. There has been a willingness on the part of the European Union to cut Ukraine off from Russia, and also a lot of things to blame on the Russian side.”

And here we are in 2022.

Sources and Further Reading (in French)

Editorial by Éric Denécé, “Ukraine: the world is upside down!” CF2R, no. 33, March 2014, https://cf2r.org/editorial/ukraine-le-monde-a-lenvers/. Mentioned in this article: In February 8, 1976, a referendum was held in Mayotte for the island’s annexation to France. The UN considers this referendum of 1976 as null and void, and condemns the violation of the territorial integrity of the Comoros and asks France to leave Mayotte.

Thomas Guénolé and Katerina Ryzhakova-Proshin, “Ukraine: stop Manichaeism!”, Slate.fr, December 24, 2013.  www.slate.fr/tribune/81479/ukraine-halte-manicheisme

Eric Denécé, “Intervention en Syrie : la recherche d’un prétexte à tout prix,” CF2R, Editorial no. 32, September 2013, https://cf2r.org/editorial/intervention-en-syrie-la-recherche-dun-pretexte-a-tout-prix/

“Eric Denécé, “The dangerous drift of American ‘democracy,’” CF2R Editorial no. 31, August 2013, https://cf2r.org/editorial/la-dangereuse-derive-de-la-democratie-americaine-2/

Hubert Védrine, “Five proposals to get out of the Ukrainian crisis,” Rue 89, March 8, 2014.  http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2014/03/08/hubert-vedrine-cinq-propositions-sortir-crise-ukrainienne-250511